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The North American Veterinary Anesthesia Society (NAVAS) helps veterinary professionals and caregivers advance and improve the safe administration of anesthesia and analgesia to all animals, through development of standards consistent with recent findings documented in high quality basic and clinical scientific publications and texts. >>Read More

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The North American
Veterinary Anesthesia Society

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From the Cockpit to the Operating Theatre

The following is a link to a BBC Radio 4 report published July 20, 2016. Their description follows:

The human brain is fallible. In emergency situations it can be easily overloaded with information or be unable to override social rules of hierarchy and deference. This can have disastrous consequences, particularly in scenarios like aeroplane failures or surgical emergencies. On March 27, 1977 one of the deadliest ever air crashes happened in Tenerife, killing 583 people. There was nothing technically wrong with either plane involved in the collision.

 

The overriding factor was found to be the authority gradient in the cockpit of 1 plane with the high status captain overruling the co pilot who thought they weren't cleared for take off. This was a game changing event for the airline industry. Claudia Hammond investigates how years of research in aviation psychology have made events like that a rarity and have given rise to huge improvements in understanding human behaviour and how mistakes are made so deathly disasters can be prevented. The world of aviation has embraced a so called 'just culture' where reporting errors and near misses are encouraged to prevent a similar mistake turning into a disaster in the future. But what has medicine learned from aviation psychology and how close is it to a similar just culture?

 

Surgical check lists have been introduced to try and prevent errors like operating on the wrong limb and making sure teams communicate with one another. But how effective are they and could surgery learn more from aviation about the psychology of safety and being open about errors to prevent them in the future?